Abstract. We observe that Dependent Choice is a sufficient choice principle for developing the basic theory of proper forcing, and for deriving generic absoluteness for the Chang model in the presence of large cardinals. We also investigate some basic consequences of the Proper Forcing Axiom in ZF, and formulate a natural question about the generic absoluteness of the Proper Forcing Axiom in ZF + DC and ZFC.
Introduction
The Axiom of Choice is a staple of modern mathematics which requires little introduction nowadays. However, as the reader is probably aware, the Axiom of Choice also has some controversial implications, especially in analysis. Weakening the Axiom of Choice to one of its countable variants, the Principle of Dependent Choice, is enough to let most of classical analysis through, while not enough to prove the existence of 'pathological' subsets of the real line (e.g., non-measurable sets or sets without the Baire property).
In this work we observe that Dependent Choice is enough-in fact the minimum needed-of the Axiom of Choice to develop the theory of proper forcing. We also show that it is enough to provide us with generic absoluteness for the Chang model, in the preserve of large cardinals, at least assuming our forcings preserve Dependent Choice. 1 We also show that assuming the Proper Forcing Axiom a stronger version of Dependent Choice must hold, and 2 ℵ0 = ℵ 2 . We do not know how to prove that the Proper Forcing Axiom does not imply the Axiom of Choice, 2 but we do suggest a possible way to prove such a statement assuming some generic absoluteness of the Proper Forcing Axiom (together with reasonable large cardinal assumptions).
1.1. The basic definitions. In our paper we redefine the notion of H(κ) to work in a context where the Axiom of Choice may fail. We then use this definition when discussing proper forcing. In our paper a notion of forcing is a partially ordered set P with a maximum denoted by 1 P . If p, q ∈ P we say that q extends p, or that it is a stronger condition, if q ≤ p. If two conditions have a common extension we say that they are compatible. A forcing P is weakly homogeneous if for every two conditions p and q there is an automorphism π such that πp and q are compatible. If P is weakly homogeneous, then for every p ∈ P and every statement ϕ in the forcing language for P, p ϕ if and only if ϕ. Also, if P and Q are weakly homogeneous forcing notions, then so is P × Q.
We denote P-names byẋ, and if x is a set in the ground model, we denote the canonical name for x byx. Ifẋ andẏ are P-names, we say thatẏ appears inẋ if there is some condition p such that p,ẏ ∈ẋ. We then recursively definė x ↾ p = { p * ,ẏ ↾ p |ẏ appears inẋ, p * ≤ p, p * ẏ ∈ẋ}.
Not assuming the Axiom of Choice, the terminology, definitions and notations surrounding cardinals become vague. We consider cardinals in the broader sense: if x can be well-ordered, then |x| is the least ordinal that has a bijection with x; otherwise, |x| is the Scott cardinal of x: |x| = {y | ∃f : x → y a bijection} ∩ V α , for the least α where the intersection is non-empty. Greek letters (with the notable exception of ϕ and π) will usually denote ordinals, and specifically ℵ numbers when we assume that they denote infinite cardinals.
We write |x| ≤ |y| to denote that there is an injection from x into y, and |x| ≤ * |y| to denote that x is empty or else there is a surjection from y onto x. The notation |x| < |y| denotes the statement |x| ≤ |y| and |y| |x|, and |x| < * |y| is defined from ≤ * similarly. Finally, for a set x, the Hartogs number of x is ℵ(x) = min{κ | κ |x|} and the Lindenbaum number of x is ℵ * (x) = min{κ | κ * |x|}.
Hereditary sets
One of the key constructions in set theory is structures of the form H(κ), where κ is a cardinal. These are usually 4 defined as {x | | tcl(x)| < κ}. Assuming that κ is a regular cardinal, these sets are models of ZFC − , namely all the axioms of ZFC except the Power Set Axiom (which can hold for "small sets" when κ is sufficiently large). Of course, in almost all the definitions we have we can replace H(κ) with V α for "sufficiently nice α", meaning one where enough of Replacement is satisfied. But this requires more care in noting what these Replacement axioms are which we are using, and virtually nobody wants that. Not when a nice alternative like H(κ) is available.
In the absence of the Axiom of Choice, however, we want to have H(κ) reflect the fact that choice fails. This cannot be done when taking the same definition at face value, since it implies that if x ∈ H(κ) then x can be well-ordered. This means that we need to modify the definition of H(κ). Definition 2.1. Given a set x, H(x) is the class {y | |x| ≮ * | tcl(y)|}. We denote by H(<x) the union of the classes H(y) such that |y| < * |x|.
Note that for an infinite cardinal κ, H(κ) = H(< κ + ) and if κ is a regular limit cardinal, then H(< κ) = H(κ). Proof. Clearly H(κ) is a transitive class. We want to argue that H(κ) ⊆ V κ , which means it is a set. For this we need the following claim: for a set x the following are equivalent:
(a) the von Neumann rank of x is α, and
In other words, if x has rank α, then its transitive closure contains elements of any rank below α.
We prove this equivalence by ∈-induction on x. Suppose that rank(x) = α. Then for all β < α there is some y ∈ x such that α > rank(y) ≥ β. By the induction hypothesis, tcl(y)∩V γ+1 \V γ = ∅ for all γ < β, and therefore tcl(x)∩V γ+1 \V γ = ∅; moreover y ∈ tcl(x) ∩ V β+1 \ V β , so indeed α is the minimal ordinal satisfying (b). On the other hand, assuming (b) it is clear that rank(x) ≥ α. But if rank(x) > α, then for some y ∈ x the rank of y is at least α, in which case the above argument shows that tcl(x) ∩ V α+1 \ V α = ∅, so α is not the minimal ordinal satisfying (b).
Using this equivalence we argue that if rank(x) > κ, then x / ∈ H(κ). This is clear, since tcl(x) can be mapped onto κ by mapping each element to its rank. So indeed H(κ) ⊆ V κ , and so it is a transitive set.
For the second part, the transitivity of H(κ) and the fact that κ > ω provide us with all the axioms except Replacement. But note that if f : x → y, and y can be mapped onto κ, then x can be mapped onto κ. So in fact H(κ) satisfies the second-order variant of Replacement.
Finally, if κ is a strong limit cardinal, then by definition V α ∈ H(κ) for all α < κ, and equality follows. If κ is also regular, then by the work of Blass-Dimitriou-Löwe in [2] , this implies that V κ |= ZF 2 .
Remark 2.3.
It is interesting to note that the requirement that κ is an ℵ is crucial for the proof that H(κ) is even a set. The definition can be used with any cardinal x, but if x is not well-ordered, then |x| ≮ * κ for any ordinal κ, meaning that Ord ⊆ H(x). In the definition, we could have artificially cropped H(x) when x is not well-orderable, in order to ensure that H(x) remains a set, but we want to somehow reflect the structure of the universe in a natural way and this cropping seems artificial and unjustified by the mathematics at this point. 
Remark 2.5. It is consistent that ℵ * (R) = κ is a limit cardinal (e.g. assuming determinacy) in which case R ∈ H(κ) but R / ∈ H(<κ).
Dependent Choice
Definition 3.1. Let κ be an ℵ number. We denote by DC κ the following statement: Every κ-closed tree without maximal elements has a chain of order type κ. We use DC <κ to abbreviate ∀λ < κ, DC λ , and for κ = ℵ 0 we simply write DC.
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Among the basic consequences of DC we have the Axiom of Choice for countable families of non-empty sets, the countability of every countable union of countable sets, the regularity of ω 1 , and many others. 
Proof. The proof that (1) implies (2) is the usual proof of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, noting that it does not use more than DC. The implications (2) =⇒ (3) and (3) =⇒ (4) are easy and trivial, respectively. The last implication is obtained by noting that if DC fails, then there is some α such that DC fails in V α . Taking a countable elementary submodel M there is some T ∈ M such that T is a counterexample to DC. However, by elementarity T ∩ M is a subtree of T which is countable and without maximal elements and therefore contains an infinite branch, which is a contradiction.
Of course, in the above equivalence, we can replace V α by H(ℵ α ), or by any filtration of the universe.
Part 1. CCC, properness, and forcing axioms without choice

Proper Forcing
Definition 4.1. Let P be a notion of forcing. We say that P is proper if for any sufficiently large κ, 6 and every countable elementary submodel M ≺ (H(κ), ∈, P), if p ∈ P ∩ M , then p has an extension which is M -generic. Namely, there is some
Without choice, however, properness can be a bit quirky.
Proposition 4.2. The following are equivalent:
(
There exists a forcing which is not proper.
Proof. The implication from (1) to (2) is the usual proof in ZFC that a proper forcing cannot collapse ω 1 . The implication from (2) to (3) is trivial. Finally, if DC fails, then the definition of properness holds vacuously by the definition of "sufficiently large κ", thus making every forcing proper.
Remark 4.3. We could have replaced "sufficiently large" by explicitly requiring κ to be any fixed cardinal such that H(κ) has both the power set of P and the basic tools needed for defining the forcing relation. One could also define a hierarchy saying that P is "κ-proper" if every countable elementary submodel M ≺ H(κ) such that P ∈ M , etc., and then define proper as "κ-proper for all κ". However, we feel that the above is a good definition as it is flexible enough to allow for a certain degree of freedom in choosing κ and as it provides us with this nice characterization of DC.
On the other hand, if one decides that it is best to require something explicit about κ, or stick to the "κ-properness" definition, then the failure of DC at H(ω 1 ) (e.g. if there is a Dedekind-finite set of reals) will imply that every forcing is proper, whereas this will not be the case if DC first fails at some point above H(ω 1 ). So we would be getting an odd equivalence of "every forcing is proper" given that choice of 'properness'; avoiding this oddness is a good motivation for picking the inherently ambiguous definition of properness as we did above.
Proposition 4.4. Every σ-closed forcing is proper.
Proof. If M is a countable elementary submodel of some H(κ) with P ∈ M , then enumerate the dense open sets in M as {D n | n ∈ ω} and enumerate P ∩ M as {p n | n ∈ ω}, and for any p ∈ P ∩ M , recursively construct a decreasing sequence such that q 0 = p and q n+1 is the least p k such that p k ∈ D n and p k ≤ q n . Since P is σ-closed, there is some lower bound q of all the q n 's and it is clear that q is an M -generic condition.
One ambition might be to prove that every ccc forcing is proper, but without the Axiom of Choice chain conditions are tricky to even formulate. Mirna Džamonja suggested in private communication to the authors to use this as a way to formulate ccc, at least in the presence of DC, by saying that every condition is M -generic for any countable elementary submodel M . Of course, under this definition it is trivial that every ccc forcing is proper.
Theorem 4.5. If P is proper and DC holds, then DC.
Proof. LetṪ be a P-name for a tree of height ω without maximal nodes and let p ∈ P. Let M be a countable elementary submodel of some sufficiently large H(κ) such thatṪ , p, P ∈ M .
Let q be an M -generic condition extending p and letṪ * = M ∩Ṫ . For each n < ω, let D n be the collection of conditions p ∈ P for which there is some P-namė t such that p "ṫ is a node inṪ of level n". For every n, D n is a dense subset of P in M . Hence, D n ∩ M is predense below q for each n, and as a consequence q forces thatṪ * is a subtree ofṪ of height ω. By a similar argument, we also have that q forcesṪ * not to have any maximal nodes. But then, since of courseṪ * is forced to be countable, q forces thatṪ * has a branch. We have shown that every condition in P can be extended to a condition adding an branch throughṪ , which means that DC.
This shows that one cannot violate DC with a proper forcing, which is somewhat similar to the fact you cannot violate AC with any forcing. We will next argue that in fact ZF + DC is a good base theory for working with proper forcing. Proof. If DC fails, then this holds vacuously. If DC holds, the usual proofs as given in the context of ZFC also work here, noting that all relevant countable choices in the ZFC proofs can equally be made in the present context; for a reference see [1] . However, the following caveat is needed here.
In ZFC we usually define the iteration P * Q as a partial order on p,q , whereq is a P-name such that q ∈Q. We could replace this with p q ∈Q, and while for a two-step iteration this is entirely inconsequential, for a countable support iteration this matters a lot.
Moving from p q ∈Q to q ∈Q usually requires the Axiom of Choice. But we can circumvent this as follows: ifq is a name which appears inQ and p q ∈Q, then defineq * as {1 Q ↾ p ′ | p ′ ⊥ p} ∪q ↾ p, and easily q * ∈Q and p q * =q. Proof. First note that by DC ω1 , we immediately have that ℵ 1 ≤ 2 ℵ0 , and applying PFA to the binary tree 2 <ω we get that ℵ 1 < 2 ℵ0 . Moreover, by DC ω1 we can choose a ladder system on ω 1 , i.e., a sequence C α | α < ω 1 is a limit ordinal such that each C α is a cofinal subset of α of order type ω. It then also follows that there is a sequence S α | α < ω 1 of pairwise disjoint stationary subsets of ω 1 .
The Proper Forcing Axiom
Next we want to point out that Moore's proof that the Mapping Reflection Principle implies that 2 ℵ0 dense open sets admit a filter meeting them all, and add that ℵ 1 = 2 ℵ0 to avoid trivialities. In that case in models of ZF + DC + (|x| < 2 ℵ0 → |x| ≤ ℵ 0 ), e.g. in Solovay's model or models of AD, this type of axiom holds vacuously since by DC every countable family of dense open sets admits a filter meeting them, and every collection of strictly less than 2 ℵ0 sets is necessarily countable. We feel that this vacuity is a good reason not to adopt such definition.
Of course, we can replace <2 ℵ0 by < * 2 ℵ0 , namely require that there is a surjective map from the continuum onto the family of dense open sets but there is no surjection in the other direction. Since there is a surjection from the continuum onto ω 1 , and we require that 2 ℵ0 = ℵ 1 , there is no surjection in the other direction. Therefore formulating PFA this way implies every collection of ℵ 1 dense open sets admits a generic filter. This is enough to prove DC ω1 , and the above arguments would then imply that 2 ℵ0 = ℵ 2 . Even weakening PFA to Martin's Axiom (assuming DC and defining ccc as "every condition is M -generic for every countable model M " as proposed to us by Dža-monja), the corresponding forcing axiom applied to Add(ω, x) would imply that if there is a surjection from the continuum onto x, then either there is a surjection from x onto the reals or there is an injection from x into the continuum. And in particular ℵ 1 < 2 ℵ0 .
We finish this section by pointing out the following consistency result. 7 then the standard iteration for forcing PFA in ZFC using lottery sums forces PFA in ZF + DC.
Proposition 5.5. If κ is a supercompact cardinal,
Does PFA imply the Axiom of Choice?
Probably not. In fact, if δ < κ are such that δ is supercompact and κ is a Reinhardt cardinal, then forcing PFA via a forcing P ⊆ V δ as in Proposition 5.5 will preserve the Reinhardtness of κ.
We would of course have liked to produce a model of PFA without the Axiom of Choice starting from a more reasonable assumption (in the region of supercompact cardinals). However, this seems to be a much more difficult task than one would originally believe it to be. We believe that outlining this difficulty is constructive, and raises some interesting questions about the absoluteness of PFA even between models of ZFC.
The "obvious construction" would be to start with a model of ZFC + PFA, then construct a symmetric extension 'à la the first model Cohen', using Add(ω 2 , ω 2 ) as our forcing, thus obtaining an intermediate model which is closed under ω 1 -sequences. Using the König-Yoshinobu Theorem from [6] , the full generic extension must satisfy PFA, so the intermediate model should too.
However, when getting down to brass tacks, one sees that the question is this: If P is a proper forcing, is P also proper in a large model which agrees on the same ω 1 -sequences?
This leads us to a very interesting question, which even in the context of ZFC has no obvious answer: Question 6.1. Suppose that P is an ω 2 -directed-closed forcing and PFA. Does that mean that PFA holds in the ground model?
Of course, to make our example, we would need to argue with a proof in a model of ZF + DC ω1 , rather than a model of ZFC. But we are optimistic that a proof in ZFC will also work-mutatis mutandis-in ZF + DC ω1 .
When approaching the above question, it seems that an easy way to solve it would be to prove the following statement: if Q is an ω 2 -directed-closed forcing and P is proper, then Q "P is proper". However in a private correspondence, Yasuo Yoshinobu sent us a proof of the following ZFC theorem, showing that this version of the question admits a negative answer.
Theorem 6.2 (Yoshinobu; ZFC). Given a regular cardinal κ > ω, there is a forcing of the form
κ ) * Q, whereQ is a ccc forcing, which collapses ω 1 after forcing with Add(κ, 1).
Part 2. Generic Absoluteness without Choice
Motivation and limitations
Definition 7.1. Let κ be an ordinal, the κ-Chang model denoted by C κ , is the ⊆-minimal model of ZF containing all the ordinals and closed under κ-sequences. This model can always be constructed as L(P κ + (Ord)). In the case where κ = ω, we omit ω from the terminology and notation, and refer to it as the Chang model.
In this section we will prove that under large cardinal assumptions, the theory of the Chang model is generically absolute under forcings which preserve DC. There is a foundational motivation for this in that most of real analysis lives inside L(R) and can be carried out in ZF + DC. This means that ZF + DC is a very natural meta-theory for analysis. This makes it natural to enquire whether or not full AC is an overkill when it comes to deriving generic absoluteness for L(R) or even for the Chang model modulo large cardinals, 8 in the same way that, say, CH or ¬CH are indeed overkills when deriving generic absoluteness for these inner models with ZFC as base theory.
It is important to realize that non-trivial instances of generic absoluteness for the Chang model may be blocked unless we restrict our considerations to forcing notions preserving DC: This provides us with a model M of ZF + DC where κ is still a supercompact cardinal in the sense of Woodin, as defined below,
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, and M |= cf(ω 2 ) = ω 1 ; moreover any countable sequence of ordinals in M belongs to the ground model V . Therefore the Chang model C in M is the same as those of V .
Working in M , let G be an M -generic filter for Col(ω,
This fact is reflected to C since it is witnessed by a countable sequence of ordinals, despite the fact that Col(ω, ω 1 ) has size ℵ 1 (without using any choice!) and thus is strictly less than κ. However, cf(ω 1 ) = ω is a Σ 2 statement over the Chang model.
Remark 7.3.
The above proof shows of course that if κ is, say, a supercompact cardinal in the ZFC model V , then there is a symmetric extension M satisfying DC in which κ remains supercompact and such that Σ 2 -generic absoluteness for the Chang models fails between M and the Col(ω, ω 1 )-extension of M (which kills DC). Hence, there is no hope for proving Σ 2 -generic absoluteness for the Chang model in general over the base theory ZF+DC unless we restrict to forcings preserving DC. Question 7.4. Can generic absoluteness for L(R) fail in the presence of large cardinals without the requirement that DC is preserved? Moreover, is it at all possible in the presence of R # that ω 1 is singular in L(R)?
Supercompactness
Definition 8.1 (Woodin, Definition 220 in [9] ). For an ordinal α we say that κ is V α -supercompact if there exists some β > α and an elementary embedding j : V β → N such that:
(1) N is a transitive set and N Vα ⊆ N , (2) the critical point of j is κ (in particular j is non-trivial),
If κ is V α -supercompact for all α, we say that it is a supercompact cardinal.
Assuming the Axiom of Choice holds, this definition is of course equivalent to the standard definition by deriving fine and normal measures from the elementary embedding.
Given an infinite regular cardinal λ and a non-empty set X, Col(λ, <X) is the forcing, ordered by reverse inclusion, of all functions p such that | dom p| < λ, dom p ⊆ λ × X, and p(α, x) ∈ x for all α < λ and x ∈ X. It is straightforward to see that Col(ω, <X) is weakly homogeneous and that forcing with Col(ω, <X) adds surjections from ω onto all members of X.
The following technical lemma, Lemma 8.2, is a rendering of [9] , Theorem 226. This lemma will be crucially used in the proof of Lemma 9.1 (and of Lemma 9.3).
Lemma 8.2 (Woodin; ZF + DC).
Suppose κ is a supercompact cardinal and P ∈ V κ is a forcing notion preserving DC. There is then a strictly increasing sequence κ ξ | ξ < κ of strongly inaccessible cardinals below κ, together with a sequence Q ξ | 1 ≤ ξ ≤ κ of forcing notions and a sequence Q P ξ | 1 ≤ ξ ≤ κ of P-names for forcing notions, satisfying the following conditions.
(1) κ 0 is such that P ∈ V κ0 and such that • Col(ω 1 , <V κ0 ) forces DC <κ0 over V κ , and
, and
, then δ remains supercompact after forcing with Q κ over V (after forcing with
Proof. Except for (7), the proof of all conclusions is the same as in the proof of Theorem 226 in [9] . As to conclusion (7), suppose q 0 and q 1 are two Q κ -conditions. We want to show that there is an automorphism π : Q κ → Q κ such that πq 0 and q 1 are compatible. We may assume without any loss of generality that q 0 and q 1 have the same support E ⊆ κ and that for every ξ ∈ E, the trivial condition forces
and such that there is a sequence doth ξ | ξ ∈ σ of names for bijectionṡ 
and which, for x ∈ d ξ , sends x to x, d ξ and x, d ξ to x. Let now π : Q κ → Q κ be the function sending q ∈ Q κ to the condition with the same support as q such that for every ξ ∈ supp(q), (πq)(ξ) is forced to be q(ξ) unless ξ ∈ E, in which case (πq)(ξ) is forced to be the condition in the relevant Levy collapsing whose domain is the set of α, x such that α,ḣ ξ (x) ∈ dom(q(ξ)) and such that for every such α, x ,
But then π is an automorphism of Q κ with the desired property. 
Proof. Let G ⊆ P be a V -generic filter and let H ⊆ Q 
Claim 9.2. For every limit ordinal α ≤ κ, Q α and Q
Proof. It suffices to prove, by induction on α, for α < κ a nonzero limit ordinal, that Q α and Q P α are forcing-equivalent in V [G], and for this it is enough to prove that if ξ < κ, and H ξ ⊆ Q ξ and H
, then the following holds by a uniform procedure (in ξ).
. But then we can find f ξ if we are in the situation (1) (resp., f ′ ξ if we are in situation (2)) by Cantor-Bernstein's theorem, since
and since we have one-to-one functions i ξ , i
Finally, the above description is obviously uniform in ξ.
The above claim finishes the proof since then there is some
Similarly, we can prove the following lemma. 
The main theorem in this section is the following. Proof. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that P forces that (C V ; ∈, r) r∈R V and (C V [Ġ] ; ∈, r) r∈R V disagree on the truth value of some sentence ∃x∀yϕ(x, y), where ϕ is a restricted formula. By our large cardinal assumption we may then fix a supercompact cardinal κ such that (C Vκ ; ∈, r) r∈R V |= ∃x∀yϕ(x, y) ⇐⇒ (C Vκ [G] ; ∈, r) r∈R V |= ¬∃x∀yϕ(x, y) and such that there is a supercompact cardinal δ < κ such that P ∈ V δ . We show that (C Vκ ; ∈, r) r∈R V and (C Vκ [G] ; ∈, r) r∈R V are elementarily equivalent, which will be a contradiction.
Theorem 9.4 (ZF + DC
By Lemma 9.1 and Lemma 9.3 we know that there are, in some outer model, (where Q ξ | ξ ≤ κ is the iteration given by Lemma 8.2). But then, by the weak homogeneity of Q κ × Col(ω, <V δ )-where the weak homogeneity of Q κ is given by Lemma 8.2 (7)-, the theories of (C Vκ ; ∈, r) r∈R V and (C Vκ [G] ; ∈, r) r∈R V are the same.
Using a similar argument one can prove the following. Note the second order character of the hypothesis of Theorem 9.5. This hypothesis can of course be taken to be an infinite scheme asserting that for every formula Θ(x) with parameters defining a closed and unbounded class of ordinals there is some supercompact cardinal κ such that Θ(κ). Many reasonable large cardinal assumption could be used here in place of this. Nevertheless, it is not clear to us whether the existence of one supercompact cardinal suffices to yield the conclusion.
The following version of Theorem 9.4 for L(R) can be derived by the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 9.4 together with the fact that, under the existence of a supercompact cardinal, R # exists in any set-forcing extension, and together with Woodin's classical result that the Axiom of Determinacy holds in L(R) assuming ZFC and the existence of infinitely many Woodin cardinals below a measurable cardinal. 
